

29 SEPTEMBER 1947

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1517-A		3242	Telegram from Acting Ambassador FUJII to Foreign Minister HIROTA dated 16 November 1935		29537
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1 Monday, 29 September 1947

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4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.

16 - - -

17 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
18 to English interpretation was made by the  
19 Language Section, INTFE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's permission,  
4 the accused SHIRATORI will be absent during the whole  
5 of the morning session from the courtroom conferring  
6 with his counsel.

7 Mr. Yamaoka.

8 MR. YAMAOKA: May it please the Tribunal, I  
9 should like to announce that No. 30 on our order of  
10 proof, dated 23 September 1947, defense document 2163,  
11 and No. 84 on the same order of proof, defense document  
12 2466, have been withdrawn.

13 Furthermore, if the Tribunal please, in the  
14 light of the deletions from this witness' testimony,  
15 ordered by the Tribunal last Friday on the ground that  
16 Mr. ARITA should be the proper witness to testify on  
17 such matters, we have been trying to draft such a new  
18 affidavit which will cover those points to be submitted  
19 by the witness ARITA who will be later called. We are  
20 hopeful that this new affidavit will be ready in time,  
21 when Mr. ARITA is called, on the order of proof. But  
22 if, owing to mechanical difficulties, the affidavit is  
23 not ready in time, may I respectfully request the per-  
24 mission of the Tribunal to recall the witness ARITA for  
25 the submission of that further affidavit.



1 THE PRESIDENT: You are not likely to finish  
2 the presentation of your evidence today, apart from  
3 ARITA, or tomorrow, perhaps.

4 MR. YAMAOKA: I understand, if your Honors  
5 please, that Mr. OKAMOTO desires to conduct cross-  
6 examination on behalf of General MINAMI.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. OKAMOTO.

8 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

9 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO:

10 Q Did the witness visit Manchuria or China in  
11 1935?

12 A According to my recollection, it was in 1936  
13 that I made this visit.

14 Q Did you not in 1935?

15 A According to my recollection, it was in 1936.

16 Q Who was the Japanese Ambassador to Manchuria  
17 in 1935?

18 A According to my recollection, it was General  
19 MINAMI that was Ambassador in 1935.

20 Q Was General MINAMI, as Ambassador, under the  
21 supervision of the Foreign Minister?

22 A Yes, as you say.

23 Q You were the Director of the Bureau of East  
24 Asiatic Affairs at that time, were you not?

25 A Yes, I was.

1 Q Was there any instance that Ambassador  
2 MINAMI acted contrary to the instructions of the  
3 Foreign Minister?

4 A I have no recollection that he ever did such  
5 a thing.

6 Q Was there any instance that MINAMI sent an  
7 ultimatum to the Chinese authorities contrary to the  
8 wishes of the Japanese Government?

9 A No, I have no such recollection.

10 Q The witness states in item 8 of his affidavit,  
11 page 3 of the English version, the last paragraph, as  
12 follows: "My memory is not quite unfailing about the  
13 particulars of those old occurrences but there occurred  
14 frequent skirmishes from May or June onward, between  
15 the Kwantung Army and Chinese forces, near the border  
16 between Jehol and the provinces of Hopeh and Chahar --  
17 such remote and out-of-the-way places where no official  
18 from the Foreign Office was stationed."

19 Now, let me ask you, do you remember the so-  
20 called Northern Chahar Incident or Chang Pei Incident  
21 in June, 1945?

22 THE INTERPRETER: Correction on the date; 1935.

23 The witness' statement: I do not remember  
24 the details of the Incidents themselves, but I remember  
25 that 3 or 4 small incidents occurred.

1 Q At that time was there a Japanese Consul at  
2 Kalgan?

3 A According to my recollection, there was.

4 Q Do you remember his name?

5 A No, I am sorry, I don't.

6 Q Was his name not HASHIMOTO?

7 A It is not in my recollection.

8 Q The witness states in the next sentence,  
9 following the above quotation of the affidavit, as  
10 follows: "The Kwantung Army, and sometimes the North  
11 China Stationary Force, would lodge protests directly  
12 with the Chinese Government on all such occasions..."

13 A Yes.

14 Q Does this statement of yours also apply to the  
15 Northern Chahar Incident?

16 A According to my recollection, these border  
17 incidents consisted of the First North Chahar Incident,  
18 the Second North Chahar Incident; the First Chang Pei  
19 Incident and the Second Chang Pei Incident -- these 4  
20 incidents. And in relation to these incidents the army  
21 negotiated directly with the other side.

22 Q According to exhibit No. 199, statement of  
23 Ching Teh-chun, this Incident was decided -- was des-  
24 cribed as follows: "After the departure of the said  
25 Japanese," the four Japanese soldiers detained by the

1 Chinese side, "HASHIMOTO, the Japanese Consul at Kalgan,  
2 suddenly protested," etc. And it further follows the  
3 Japanese Consul demanded the punishment of responsible  
4 officials and employees from the Chinese authorities.  
5 "He also demanded assurance against recurrence of  
6 similar nature."

7 Now, did the witness not receive such an  
8 information from the Consul at Kalgan?

9 A It is not in my recollection.  
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1 Q According to the said exhibit, No. 199, the  
2 matter was referred to the headquarters of the Japa-  
3 nese garrison forces in Tientsin. This was after  
4 Consul HASHIMOTO announced the matter officially. Did  
5 you not receive such an information from Tientsin?

6 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: That was after  
7 Consul HASHIMOTO negotiated, not "announced officially" --  
8 negotiated.

9 A It is not in my recollection.

10 Q Does the witness know that the Tientsin  
11 garrison force was independent from the Kwantung Army  
12 and was quite a different unit?

13 A Since this concerns the Army, I do not know  
14 the details of its organization. However, I have  
15 heard people say that on several occasions.

16 Q Do you know that this Northern Chahar Inci-  
17 dent is the only case in 1935 of which General Ching  
18 Teh-chun, a Chinese witness, made a complaint in his  
19 exhibit 199?

20 A This is the first time I have ever heard of  
21 such a thing.

22 Q The witness states in item 8 of his affidavit,  
23 page 4, the fifth line from the top, as follows:  
24 "They," meaning the Kwantung Army or the North China  
25 Garrison, "enforced the fulfillment of these conditions



1 with an ultimatum." Where and from what source did  
2 you get such information?

3 A According to my recollection, it was from  
4 the Legation in Peking.

5 Q Was not the information derived from English  
6 or American newspaper reports?

7 A According to my recollection, it was not from  
8 American or British newspaper reports, but from tele-  
9 graphic reports from the Legation in Peking.

10 Q Do you know that although General Ching Teh-  
11 chun accuses Japan of many things in his exhibit 199  
12 he never mentioned a word about an ultimatum?

13 A Since I have not read the affidavit of Ching  
14 Teh-chun, I do not know.

15 R. T. OKAMOTO: The witness testified in  
16 this Tribunal on the 17th, this month, as follows:  
17 "They," that is, subordinates of the witness when he  
18 was Consul General in Tientsin, "secured information  
19 from whatever sources were available, such as, news-  
20 paper articles, conversations," and "rumors," etc.

21 THE PRESIDENT: You need not remind us of  
22 that. You can only remind him. We do not want to be  
23 reminded of what he said last week, or the week before.

24 Q Are your statements now in question based on  
25 the same sort of information?

1 A What is the meaning of your statement? May  
2 I have it repeated?

3 Q If I may quote the portion the witness stated  
4 in this Tribunal on the 17th of this month, you stated  
5 then that you received your informations from sources  
6 such as newspaper articles, conversations, and rumors,  
7 etc. Did you not -- owing to the large number of infor-  
8 mations coming in from these various sources, you were  
9 unable to ascertain the credibility of these infor-  
10 mations. Were not your informations on this occasion  
11 also the same as this statement you made the other  
12 day?

13 A When I testified relative to DOHIMARA's  
14 action, the telegram I sent relative to DOHIMARA's  
15 actions was actually sent by myself. At that time, as  
16 you state, the members of the Consulate made reports  
17 to me based on information which they had obtained in  
18 the manner described by you. However, I had no means  
19 of know what means --

20 THE INTERPRETER: Correction: I have no means  
21 of knowing on what basis the telegram sent from the  
22 Legation in Peking received its information.

23 MR. T. OKAMOTO: Instead of continuing further  
24 cross-examination, I wish to refer to the testimony of  
25 MINAMI which contradicts the statement of this witness,

1 quote record 19,792 to 19,796, and I should like to say  
2 also that further evidence will be submitted later in  
3 MINAMI's individual case.

4 THE PRESIDENT: A colleague desires this question  
5 to be answered by the witness:

6 Did the reports received by the witness from  
7 Peiping reveal every time or at any time the source of  
8 the information?

9 THE WITNESS: On occasions, the source of the  
10 information was shown on the telegram, but also there  
11 were many telegrams on which no such -- on which the  
12 source was not shown.

13 MR. YAMADA: I am counsel YAMADA. On behalf  
14 of ITAGAKI, I would like to ask one question on one  
15 point.

16 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

17 BY MR. YAMADA:

18 Q Witness, I am going to ask you concerning item  
19 23 of your affidavit. According to this, you say,  
20 "There broke out the so-called Suiyuan Incident owing  
21 to the activities of a part of the officers of the Kwan-  
22 tung Army in Inner Mongolia." What was the source of  
23 your information in testifying on this point?

24 A In relation to this Incident, we at the Foreign  
25 Office, and especially myself as the Director of the  
East Asiatic Affairs, knew nothing about this Incident

1 when it occurred, as it occurred in a remote part of  
2 China. It was only when we received a protest from  
3 the Chinese Nationalist Government relative to this  
4 Incident that we first became aware of such an  
5 occurrence.  
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1 Q Do you know who were the officers who took  
2 part in the activities and can you state their names?

3 A At the time I immediately sent a query to the  
4 Central Military authorities concerned. At that time  
5 an officer who was working with the Central Military  
6 authorities and with whom I was in continual contact  
7 told me that this was the only activity -- the activi-  
8 ty of one or two junior officers in the Kwantung Army.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. YAMAOKA.

10 MR. YAMAOKA: No further examination.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

12 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

13 BY MR. COMYNS CARR:

14 Q Mr. KAWASHIMA, do you say that you were very  
15 closely in the confidence of Mr. HIROTA while he was  
16 Foreign Minister and Prime Minister?

17 A I could -- It would be -- I shall refrain from  
18 stating from my side that HIROTA placed great confidence  
19 in me. However, I can state surely that I was always  
20 in very close contact with him.

21 Q Do you say that he always disclosed to you his  
22 real opinions and intentions?

23 A It is my belief that he did.

24 Q Do you say that you are in a position to tell  
25 us his real opinions and intentions as well as he could



1 tell them to us himself?

2 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

3 MR. YAMAOKA: If your Honor please, we object  
4 to that question as calling for a conclusion of the wit-  
5 ness.

6 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled.

7 A May I have the question repeated?

8 ("hereupon, the last question  
9 was read by the Japanese court reporter.")

10 THE WITNESS: I can say with conviction -- I  
11 can tell you of anything which Mr. HIROTA told me while  
12 I was director of the East Asiatic Bureau. However, since  
13 this was all over ten years ago -- since this all relates  
14 to things that happened over ten years ago, there may  
15 be some points on which my memory fails me.

16 Q You say in paragraph 2 of your affidavit, in  
17 the middle, "It was the firm resolution of Mr. HIROTA  
18 upon assuming the office of Foreign Minister to alleviate  
19 the oppressive tension attending the Sino-Japanese rela-  
20 tions."

21 A That is so.

22 Q And in the first sentence of paragraph 3 you  
23 say, "Mr. HIROTA carried out his resolution steadily in  
24 every sphere of Japan's foreign relations."

25 Now listen to this and tell me whether it did

1 not represent HIROTA's real opinion and intention in  
2 October, 1933. immediately after he had assumed office:  
3 "I am constantly trying to work out a smooth relationship  
4 between diplomacy and national defense. In consequence  
5 of this, the war expenditure budget problem will become  
6 urgent. Then I intend to clarify my position, standing  
7 between as a third party. That is, we will expand our  
8 utmost by foreign policy, and when foreign policy arrives  
9 at its limits we will leave the matter to you, the army  
10 and navy, for disposal."

11 Now, did that not represent HIROTA's real  
12 opinions and intentions when he first took office as  
13 Foreign Minister in 1933?

14 A I don't know when and in what connection Mr.  
15 HIROTA made such a statement, but I do know that in Sep-  
16 tember, 1933, when Mr. HIROTA became Foreign Minister, he  
17 told me that because of the Manchurian Incident Sino-  
18 Japanese relations had reached a very critical stage and  
19 that it was his intention to bring about closer relations  
20 between the two parties, and also to bring about friendly  
21 relations between third powers also, and that Mr. HIROTA  
22 considered this his sole mission as Foreign Minister.  
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1 Q You say you do not know when. I will sug-  
2 gest to you the precise date, 11 October 1933.

3 A May I ask where he made this statement?

4 Q I suggest to you that he made it to Baron  
5 HANADA in the Foreign Ministry.

6 A I have never heard of such a statement.

7 Q And that he made it following upon a Five  
8 Ministers Conference.

9 Now, were not the ministers who attended  
10 Five Minister Conferences at that time the Prime  
11 Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister,  
12 the War Minister and the Navy Minister?

13 THE INTERPRETER: Will you repeat that last  
14 question, please?

15 (Whereupon, the last question was  
16 read by the official court reporter.)

17 A On the whole, it is my recollection that  
18 those were the five ministers that composed that con-  
19 ference.

20 Q And was it not HIROTA's policy throughout  
21 his holding of office to secure Japan's expansion  
22 by negotiation, if he could?

23 A I am convinced that Mr. HIROTA never had any  
24 such ideas.

25 Q And to use threats and ultimatums by the army

1 as a means of securing compliance with his negotiation  
2 demands?

3 A When the army conducted negotiations direct-  
4 ly with the Chinese, in my recollection never was  
5 there an instance when they consulted either with  
6 Foreign Minister HIROTA or with the Foreign Office.

7 Q That is hardly an answer to my question.  
8 Try again, please.

9 A May I have the question repeated, please?

10 (Whereupon, the last question was  
11 repeated by the Japanese court reporter.)

12 A Absolutely not.

13 Q And if pressure by threat was not sufficient,  
14 was he not prepared, when he thought the time suit-  
15 able, to allow the army and navy to enforce his  
16 demands by force?  
17

18 A He never allowed the army or navy to prepare  
19 for any such thing.

20 I should like to add that HIROTA's negotia-  
21 tions were all conducted through regular diplomatic  
22 channels.

23 Q Now, in paragraph 4 of your affidavit, in  
24 the middle, you are summarizing a conversation between  
25 Ambassador ARIYOSHI and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang  
in which the question of Manchukuo was raised, and you

1 say that ARIYOSHI told Wang that public opinion in  
2 Japan would not allow the government to retract the  
3 recognition of Manchukuo.

4 Do you say that that was HIROTA's opinion,  
5 or only ARIYOSHI's?

6 A I am convinced that it was not only Mr.  
7 HIROTA's opinion, or Mr. ARIYOSHI's opinion, but that  
8 it was public opinion in Japan at that time.

9 Q Do you mean by it that HIROTA was not in  
10 favor of extending or expanding Japan's control in  
11 Manchukuo?

12 A Japan had recognized Manchukuo the previous  
13 year; I believe it was on the 15th of September 1933.  
14 Foreign Minister Wang often asked Mr. ARIYOSHI in his  
15 conversations that Japan withdraw such recognition.  
16 It was in reply to these requests that Mr. ARIYOSHI  
17 made the reply to which you have just referred, and  
18 therefore I am convinced that this reply which Mr.  
19 ARIYOSHI made had nothing at all to do with Japan's  
20 attitude towards Manchukuo itself, but was directed  
21 to showing the impossibility of Japan's withdrawing  
22 recognition once -- recognition which had already  
23 been granted.

24 Q Now, you go on to say that the main subject  
25 of conversation lay in how to harmonize the difficult



1 and contradictory standpoints of both governments  
2 with respect to the Manchukuo question. "

3 Do you think that the chances of harmoniz-  
4 ing those two opinions were improved by the action  
5 taken in Manchukuo by the government of which HIROTA  
6 was a member?

7 A We had adopted the policy referred to in my  
8 affidavit because we felt that if the difficult ques-  
9 tions pending between Japan and China at the time  
10 were set aside, or conversation on that topic was  
11 avoided for the time being and an effort to obtain  
12 a mutual understanding in other spheres was conducted,  
13 that the solution of these difficult problems them-  
14 selves would become much simpler.  
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Q What I am suggesting putting to you, Mr. KUWASHIMA, is this: that HIROTA and the government of which he was a member took action throughout office so to strengthen Japan's grip on Manchukuo that it made it impossible for any peaceful negotiations with China to succeed; isn't that true?

A My view of the matter is completely different from what you have suggested. At the time, I heard an anecdote relative to these ARIYOSHI-Wang negotiations. I do not know which of the two, Mr. ARIYOSHI or Mr. Wang, made this statement, but it seems one of them compared the negotiations between Japan and China then going on at Nanking to a little rock -- a little boat, facing a rock, pulling its way along against an adverse current. The boat was trying to go upstream, and, therefore, if the rock could be avoided, sometime or other the boat would succeed in making its way upstream and in reaching its destination. This is a story I heard relative to these negotiations.

Q Now, did not the cabinet of which HIROTA was a member, in fact, greatly strengthen Japan's grip on Manchukuo particularly for the purpose of securing raw material output there for Japan?

A I do not know.

Q For instance, on the 22nd of December, 1933,

1 did not your bureau -- the East Asia Bureau of the  
2 Foreign Office -- issue a decision of the cabinet of  
3 that day concerning preparations for enforcing the  
4 monarchy in Manchukuo? Don't you remember that?

5 A I am afraid I have no clear recollection on  
6 that point at this moment.

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: That is exhibit 234,  
8 record page 2933. I will not take up time with the  
9 details.

10 Q Now, do you remember a controversy arising  
11 with the United States, continuing from August, 1934  
12 to the early part of April, 1935, about the establish-  
13 ment of an oil monopoly in Manchuria?

14 A I did hear about this matter. But, since the  
15 bureau conducting those negotiations at the time was  
16 the Commerce Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, I do not  
17 know the details of that affair.

18 Q Do you know that on November 5, 1934 the  
19 Foreign Ministry, that is, HIROTA, informed the Ameri-  
20 can Government that the control of the oil industry in  
21 Manchuria was not within the knowledge or concern of  
22 the Japanese Government --

23 A Since I have not heard that statement, I can  
24 tell you nothing about it.

25 Q (Continuing) -- on the ground that it was

1 the act of a state recognized by Japan as sovereign and  
2 independent?

3 A I have heard nothing about this matter at  
4 that time. I think it was the because the Commerce  
5 Bureau was handling the matter.

6 MR. CONYNS CARR: Your Honor, that is exhibit  
7 965, record page 9481; 939, record page 9406; and 941  
8 record page 9413.

9 Q If those statements were made by HIROTA, they  
10 were false to his knowledge and yours, weren't they?

11 A As I have stated repeatedly to you, these  
12 matters were not within my confidence, and, therefore,  
13 I can tell you nothing about it.

14 Q I am suggesting to you that the actual facts  
15 were within your confidence and you know that the state-  
16 ments are false.

17 A I can tell you with confidence as far as re-  
18 gards the structure of the Foreign Office. The Com-  
19 merce Bureau handles economic matters, whereas the East  
20 Asia Bureau, my bureau, handled mainly political mat-  
21 ters.

22 Q Did not your bureau issue the statement of  
23 a cabinet decision on the 20th of March, 1934, just a  
24 few months before these discussions began, entitled  
25 "The Summary of Japanese-Manchurian Economical Admin-

1           istration Policy"?

2           A    We may have issued such a statement relative  
3           to policy.

4           Q    Wasn't the statement declared to be for the  
5           purpose of establishing securely the base of Japan's  
6           world-wide economic expansion?

7           A    As far as I have learned, the policy of --  
8           the economic policy of Japan vis-a-vis Manchukuo was  
9           through    a peaceful exploitation of Manchurian re-  
10          sources to reap the fruits of happiness for both Man-  
11          chukuo and Japan.

12          Q    Did not the cabinet decision include the  
13          following: "Enterprises of the following kinds will be  
14          operated by special companies which hold a dominant  
15          position among the said business in Manchukuo. As a  
16          general rule, these will be directly or indirectly  
17          under the special protection and supervision of the  
18          Empire"? Do you remember that?

19          A    I have no recollection in regard to details.

20          THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
21          minutes.

22                   (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess  
23          was taken until 1100, after which the pro-  
24          ceedings were continued as follows:)  
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1 MARSHALL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: May it please the Tribunal,  
5 I find I must apologize to the Language Division for  
6 the misunderstanding that arose this morning. It  
7 appears that owing to some misunderstanding they were  
8 given the wrong documents and therefore the fault was  
9 not theirs.

10 THE MONITOR: Thank you, Mr. Comyns Carr.

11 MR. COMYNS CARR: I expect it was my error.

12 I had just read a passage, had I not, ending  
13 with the words, "under the special protection and  
14 supervision of the Empire"?

15 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

16 Q Did not the list of industries which were to be  
17 controlled in that manner as decided by the Cabinet  
18 include "No. 4, the petroleum industry"?

19 A I have no recollection on this point.

20 MR. COMYNS CARR: That is exhibit 236, record  
21 page 2939.

22 Q Now, with regard to the economic control of  
23 Manchukuo, was there not an agreement between Japan and  
24 Manchukuo in July 1935? What do you say?  
25

A My recollection on this point is not very clear.

1 Q And did not Hirota attend the Privy Council  
2 of 3 July 1935 to explain it to them?

3 A I don't remember whether he attended the Privy  
4 Council or not.

5 Q Would you be one of the Foreign Office officials  
6 who would go with him if he went to the Privy Council?

7 A Of course, I do not remember just exactly who  
8 went on each occasion but I do remember that on economic  
9 matters it was the Director of the Commerce Bureau who  
10 accompanied the Foreign Minister.

11 Q But where it was a question of concluding an  
12 agreement, would it not be in your province?

13 A Of course, when an agreement is actually signed  
14 Bureaus other than the competent bureau would be privi-  
15 leged to see the relevant document. However, since  
16 the matter was outside my jurisdiction, I do not  
17 remember it too distinctly.

18 Q Do you not remember that there was to be a  
19 joint Manchukuo-Japanese Committee, to deal with all  
20 economic matters, of eight members?

21 A I do know that such a committee was set up  
22 in Manchukuo.

23 Q Four from each country?

24 A Probably it was so.

25 Q And do you remember HIROTA explaining to the

1 Privy Council that it was quite all right because one  
2 of the Manchukuoan members would always be a Japanese  
3 who could be trusted to support the Japanese side?

4 A I do not recall whether he did or did not  
5 make such a statement.

6 MR. COLYNS CARR: It is exhibit 850, record  
7 page 8417, with particular reference to pages 4, 6 and  
8 7 of the document.

9 Q Now, I want to ask you about the AMAU state-  
10 ment, to which you refer in paragraph 5 of your affi-  
11 devit. You say that HIROTA reprimanded AMAU because  
12 of that statement.

13 A Yes, I heard this from Mr. HIROTA himself.

14 Q Was he punished?

15 A I don't believe he did.

16 Q What was wrong with it?

17 A I believe that what was wrong about this  
18 statement was that the Chief of the Information Bureau,  
19 AMAU, published this statement in the newspapers without  
20 first receiving the understanding of Foreign Minister  
21 HIROTA--

22 Q But it represented Japan's real policy, didn't  
23 it, in contrast with the public statements HIROTA was  
24 making himself?

25 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

1 MR. YAMLOKA: If your Honor please, I don't  
2 believe the witness had completed his answer before  
3 Mr. Carr asked his next question.

4 THE PRESIDENT: If he did not, let him do so.

5 A (Continued) Besides the fact that Mr. AMAU  
6 did not gain Mr. HIROTA's approval before announcing  
7 his statement, it is my belief that AMAU's statement  
8 was not in harmony with Japan's foreign policy at  
9 that time.

10 Q But you have told us that it consisted of  
11 what you call a patchwork of telegraphic instructions  
12 which had, in fact, been sent to the Japanese repre-  
13 sentatives in China.

14 A I shall have to explain the facts of the  
15 situation as it existed then. From the summer of 1932  
16 the League of Nations sent experts regarding help and  
17 also regarding economics to China.  
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1 Q Mr. Witness, please do not repeat what you  
2 have already said in your affidavit about this. If  
3 you want to say anything fresh, do; but do not merely  
4 repeat.

5 A At the time the Foreign Office received  
6 repeated information from our representatives in  
7 China that Mr. Monnet, to whom I referred in my  
8 affidavit, was drafting a plan for international  
9 help to China from which Japan was to be excluded  
10 and therefore, in order to get Mr. Monnet to stop  
11 this plan or at least to put it off for the time  
12 being, our Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs announced  
13 that such a plan would have no good results for China  
14 and also that the execution of such a plan with the  
15 exclusion of Japan would be utterly unacceptable to  
16 Japan. With such a view the Bureau of East Asiatic  
17 Affairs sent telegraphic instructions to carry on  
18 negotiations with Mr. Monnet on that basis to Ambas-  
19 sador ARIYOSHI in Nanking--  
20

21 Q All that is merely repetition of what you  
22 have said.

23 A --and also to the consul-general in Shanghai.  
24 Therefore this telegram was sent merely as an indica-  
25 tion of how to conduct negotiations in order to get  
Mr. Monnet to stop his plan or at least to put it off



1 and certainly does not represent Japanese foreign  
2 policy.

3 THE PRESIDENT: A colleague desires to know  
4 whether the reprimand of AMAU was a punishment.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: All that is merely repe-  
6 tition of what you have said in the affidavit.

7 THE PRESIDENT: I did not get an answer to  
8 my colleague's question.

9 THE MONITOR: He is about to answer, sir.

10 MR. COMYNS CARR: I beg your Honor's pardon.

11 THE WITNESS: According to Japanese law a  
12 reprimand is classed as a punishment; however, I do  
13 not know whether in this case this so-called punish-  
14 ment came within that category or not.

15 THE PRESIDENT: Was not a record made of it?

16 THE WITNESS: At least it is among the  
17 records of my bureau that Mr. HIROTA reprimanded  
18 Mr. AMAU.

19 Q Was the reprimand made public?

20 A In my recollection it was not.

21 Q Was not AMAU's real fault that he had dis-  
22 closed to the world what the Japanese Foreign Office  
23 was doing in secret?

24 A In my view it furnished an indication to the  
25 representatives in China in conducting negotiations

1 with Mr. Monnet with a view to discouraging his activ-  
2 ities relative to his economic plan for China and did  
3 not represent the foreign policy of the Imperial  
4 Japanese Government.

5 I should like to add a few words.

6 This was an instruction sent relative only  
7 to Mr. Monnet's activity and did not concern general  
8 policy.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Did HIROTA publicly announce  
10 that the AMAU statement was contrary to government  
11 policy?

12 THE WITNESS: According to my recollection  
13 the so-called AMAU statement appeared in the morning  
14 papers on the 17th of April and in a press conference  
15 two or three days later Mr. HIROTA declared that such  
16 was not the policy of the Japanese Government. Further-  
17 more, immediately after this unofficial statement of  
18 AMAU appeared, the American ambassador and the British  
19 ambassador in Tokyo both appeared at the Foreign Office  
20 one after another to ask about the matter, and in reply  
21 to these inquiries I believe either Mr. HIROTA or the  
22 Vice Minister on HIROTA's instructions met these  
23 ambassadors and told them more or less the same thing  
24 that I have described in court today.  
25

Q Was not AMAU's real fault for which he was

1 reprimanded, if he was reprimanded, that he had been  
2 so careless as to disclose to the public the instruc-  
3 tions that were being sent to the Japanese representa-  
4 tives in China?

5 A I believe that he was reprimanded not only  
6 for having been careless but also for the fact that  
7 he had made his statement in such a way as to cast  
8 suspicion on Japan that that was the real foreign  
9 policy whereas it was not.

10 Q If you say it was not the real foreign  
11 policy, do you mean that it was an instruction to the  
12 representatives in China to make false statements to  
13 Mr. Monnet?

14 A That is not so.

15 Q Were you present in the Foreign Ministry on  
16 the 17th of April 1934, that is the very morning when  
17 the statement appeared, when Baron HARADA called and  
18 had an interview with HIROTA, the Foreign Minister, and  
19 SHIGEMITSU, the Vice Minister.

20 A I was in the Foreign Office on the 17th of  
21 April; however, I do not know whether Baron HARADA  
22 visited Foreign Minister HIROTA on that day.

23 Q Did HIROTA and SHIGEMITSU both say to Baron  
24 HARADA with regard to the AMAU statement, it is nothing  
25 serious?

1       A    Since I do not know the fact of Baron  
2 HARADA's actually coming to the Foreign Office, I  
3 was not actually present at the conversation if it  
4 did take place and therefore I can tell you nothing  
5 about it.  
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Q Had the instructions which you have told us about been sent not only to the representatives of Japan in China, but to the representatives in other capitals of the world?

A In my recollection, it was sent only to our diplomatic representative in China.

Q Now, I want to refer to paragraphs 8 and 12, the part of 12 that was read, of your affidavit.

With regard to the Ho-UMEZU Agreement, was there not a time limit set?

A I do not know about that.

Q When you speak in paragraph 8 about the enforcement of conditions with an ultimatum, were you not referring amongst other instances to the Ho-UMEZU Agreement?

A As I have already said, I know nothing about the Ho-UMEZU Agreement. But since I had heard through documents that in regard to many other minor negotiations they were carried out with ultimatums, I included that in my affidavit -- time limits.

THE MONITOR: Put in time limits.

Q Do you draw a distinction between what you call a strong demand with a time limit and an ultimatum?

A Since I, myself, have never conducted or participated in such types of negotiations, I really



1 cannot say. However, my interpretation is that in an  
2 ultimatum, the right is reserved to take free action  
3 after the expiration of the time limit. In the case  
4 of a demand with a time limit, I believe it is merely  
5 a demand to reply within a certain period of time.

6 Q Did not you know that the demands to which  
7 you have referred were, in fact, accompanied by a  
8 threat of military action at the end of the time limit?

9 A As far as I can recollect, they were demands  
10 made with a time limit; a demand to reply by a certain  
11 day of a certain month.

12 Q Then why do you speak of them in your affidavit  
13 as an ultimatum?

14 A Yes, I did use the word "ultimatum," and as  
15 I have just said, I believe that it is more or less  
16 the same as -- in this case it was used in the sense  
17 of time limit. However, since at that time in the  
18 Foreign Office documents coming in and going out referred  
19 repeatedly to ultimatums, I included the term in my  
20 affidavit.

21 Q Is the distinction in your mind between a  
22 time limit and an ultimatum this, that when the threat  
23 of force is only bluff, you call it a time limit, and  
24 when it is really intended in your own minds, you call  
25 it an ultimatum?

1 A I believe it is exactly as you have said.

2 Q I see. Well, now, when the agitation, shall  
3 we call it, in favor of an independent North China was  
4 fomented by the Japanese in November 1935, do you  
5 remember, as you have stated in paragraph 12 of your  
6 affidavit, that the Kwantung Army was concentrating  
7 its mechanized troops at Shanghaiwan with a view to  
8 intimidating North China?

9 A I do remember. Furthermore, I should like  
10 to state that although you said that Japan was conduct-  
11 ing agitation to foment a movement for independence in  
12 North China, it was not actually Japan that was doing  
13 this.

14 Q Who was it?

15 A As appears in my affidavit, at the time I  
16 received information to the effect that it was carried  
17 on by junior officers of the Kwantung Army.

18 Q Why do you say junior officers?

19 A At the time there was a branch office of the  
20 consulate at Tientsin at Shanghaiwan and a vice-consul  
21 was stationed there, and I received information from  
22 that vice-consul. On receiving such information from  
23 the vice-consul at Shanghaiwan, I, as Director of the  
24 Bureau of East Asiatic Affairs, immediately called on  
25 the central military authorities to express my strong

1 disapproval and to state that such action was indeed  
2 alarming, such news was indeed alarming. At that time,  
3 the central military authority concerned told me that  
4 there was no intention on their part to threaten China.

5 Q You have not, as you said just now, stated  
6 in your affidavit that this was the work of junior  
7 officers. On the contrary, you state that it was the  
8 work of the Japanese military authorities in China,  
9 and in another place, the Kwantung Army.  
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1 Q Why do you now tell us that you said that it  
2 was the work of junior officers?

3 A As I have stated before, in the report from  
4 the vice-consul at Shanghai-kwan words were used to the  
5 effect that that was the ideology of the junior offi-  
6 cers, and also since at that time the central military  
7 authorities told me that the tendency then was that junior  
8 officers were trying to set themselves up against  
9 their superiors.

10 Q Do you suggest that the mechanized troops  
11 of the Kwantung Army could be concentrated at Shanghai-  
12 kwan on the Great Wall without the orders of MINAMI and  
13 ITAGAKI?

14 A I do not know.

15 Q Now, was HIROTA's action about that this:  
16 Did he, first of all, obtain a promise from General  
17 MINAMI that the troops would not actually be sent be-  
18 yond Shanghai-kwan without an Imperial command?

19 A I have no clear recollection on this point.  
20 I do remember that the liason officers of the central  
21 military authorities with whom I was in contact told me  
22 repeatedly words to the same effect.

23 Q Did HIROTA then give instructions to the  
24 Foreign Office officials that that fact, namely, that  
25 the troops wouldn't move without an Imperial command,

1 must on no account be allowed to leak out to China?

2 A I have no recollection of ever having received  
3 orders to such an effect or instructions to such an  
4 effect from Mr. HIROTA.

5 Q Were the two reasons given: one, that if  
6 it leaked out to China the Chinese would start caus-  
7 ing trouble and take the Japanese for fools?

8 A I remember having heard something to that  
9 effect from the army authorities with whom I was then  
10 in con t.

11 Q And was HIROTA's other reason for taking  
12 extreme precautions that it didn't leak out, that if  
13 it did leak out that the army would be very angry  
14 with him?

15 A I have no recollection.

16 Q You know very well, do you not, that the  
17 army, both the North China Army and the Kwantung  
18 Army had threatened that if the new independent  
19 councils for Hopeh-Chahar and for East Hopeh were not  
20 established by a named day military action would be  
21 taken by Japan?

22 A I have never heard any such thing.

23 Q Did you not learn that on the 18th of  
24 Novemb , 1935, DOHIHARA had announced in China, at  
25 Peking I think, that if autonomy for the North was



1 not proclaimed he was prepared to send five Japanese  
2 divisions into Hopeh and six into Shantung?

3 A I have never heard any such thing.

4 Q Had you not learned that the North China  
5 authorities or on behalf of the North China Army  
6 General DOHIMARA had fixed an ultimatum to expire at  
7 noon on the 21st of November if the formal proclama-  
8 tion of the autonomous state was not issued?

9 A I do not know.

10 Q Had you not learned that on the same day  
11 DOHIMARA had informed the newspaper men assembled  
12 in Peking that he expected a formal announcement of  
13 the new regime shortly?

14 A That also I do not know. I should like to  
15 add a few words. Until the actual establishment of  
16 the East Hopeh anti-comintern autonomous regime and  
17 the Hopeh-Chahar political council, the Foreign Office  
18 in Tokyo, and more particularly the Bureau of East  
19 Asiatic Affairs of which I was director, knew nothing  
20 either verbally or through documents of the proposed  
21 establishment of such regimes.

22 Q Did not you personally make a collection which  
23 was filed in the Foreign Office of American and other  
24 newspaper reports dealing with this matter?

25 A Maybe my subordinates collected such reports.

1     However, I, myself, as director did not see -- did  
2     not know anything about these two regimes until they  
3     had been established.

4             Q    Look at the document which is being handed  
5     to you. Is that your seal on it?

6             A    Yes.

7             Q    And does it also bear the seal of SHIGE-  
8     MITSU?

9             A    Since I am not SHIGEMITSU I cannot say with  
10    certainty.

11            Q    Does it look like it?

12            A    It does look like it. However, I cannot say  
13    for sure.

14            Q    You have seen it often enough, haven't you?

15            A    Therefore, I have stated that it certainly  
16    looks like SHIGEMITSU's seal.

17            Q    Is it addressed to HIROTA?

18            A    This is a report sent from Charge d'Affaires  
19    FUJI in London to Mr. HIROTA.

20            MR. COMYNS CARR: I now ask that that be  
21    marked as an exhibit, your Honor, and admitted into  
22    evidence.

23            THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

24            CLERK OF THE COURT: IPS document 1517-A will  
25    receive exhibit No. 3242.

1                   (Whereupon, the document above  
2                   referred to was marked prosecution's exhibit  
3                   No. 3242 and received in evidence.)

4                   THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until  
5                   half-past one.

6                   (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess  
7                   was taken.)  
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## AFTERNOON SESSION

he Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: With the Tribunal's per-  
mission, the accused KAYA will be absent from the  
courtroom for the whole of the afternoon session con-  
ferring with his counsel.

Mr. Comyns Carr.

- - -

K A Z U E K U W A S H I M A, recalled as a witness  
on behalf of the defense, resumed the stand and  
testified through Japanese interpreters as  
follows:

MR. COMYNS CARR: If your Honor please, we  
are now in a position to circulate copies of exhibit  
3242, which was admitted just before the adjournment.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Will you read it then?

MR. COMYNS CARR (Reading):

"Nov. 16, 1935 from London

"Nov. 17, 1935 arrived at the Ministry

"To: Foreign Minister HIROTA

"From: Acting Ambassador FUJII"

Containing the seals of SHIGEMITSU, Vice

1 Minister, KUWASHIMA, the present witness, East Asia  
2 Bureau, AMAU, Information Bureau.

3 "With reference to the previous telegram,  
4 No. 357.

5 "Since then, on the China problem, the news-  
6 papers, with the exception of one or two of the Labor  
7 Party, became more quiet. However, considerable  
8 attention was aroused by the reports that:

9 "(1) With regard to the North China problem,  
10 there were reports on the situation of the independent  
11 movement on the part of the Japanese military author-  
12 ities. North China had come under the control of Japan.

13 "(2) The landing of Japanese Marines in  
14 Shanghai did not give a shock to the Chinese residents,  
15 etc., etc."

16 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

17 Q Now, Mr. KUWASHIMA, did not your bureau make  
18 and file a large collection of these newspaper reports,  
19 both American and British, about what was happening in  
20 North China?

21 A I have no recollection of my bureau having  
22 made any file of newspaper reports, but I do remember  
23 that at the time we received many press telegrams from  
24 our representatives in Europe and America.

25 Q Well, now, you'd better just look at the file.



1 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
2 to the witness.)

3 Q (Continuing) Is that not a file of newspaper  
4 reports on this subject, made in your section?

5 A This collection is one that was compiled by  
6 the Information Bureau and does not belong to my  
7 bureau.

8 Q Just look at this document, if you say that.

9 (Whereupon, a document was handed  
10 to the witness.)

11 Q (Continuing) Does not that bear the seal of  
12 your section, your bureau?

13 A It does bear the seal of my section, that is,  
14 the East Asia Bureau. However, this file was compiled  
15 by the Information Bureau. It bears the seal of the  
16 Chief of the First Section of the Information Bureau.

17 Q Did not the newspaper cuttings come to your  
18 bureau, and were they not, after you had studied them,  
19 sent to the Information Bureau for filing?

20 A In my recollection, that was not the case.  
21 All newspaper and magazine reports went direct to the  
22 Information Bureau and from the Information Bureau was  
23 circulated among the various interested bureaus.  
24

25 Q Including your own?

A Yes.

1 Q Do you notice that the document I have just  
2 handed to you is addressed to Foreign Minister HIROTA  
3 from Ambassador ARIYOSHI in China?

4 A Yes.

5 MR. COMYNS CARR: I ask that the document be  
6 exhibit and circulated.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

8 CLERK OF THE COURT: Prosecution document  
9 1517-B will receive exhibit No. 3242-A.

10 (Whereupon, the document above  
11 referred to was marked prosecution exhibit  
12 No. 3242-A and received in evidence.)

13 MR. COMYNS CARR (Reading):

14 "22 Nov. 1935

15 "From: Ambassador ARIYOSHI, in China

16 "To: Foreign Minister HIROTA

17 "Attached Document received 27 Nov. 1935,  
18 with the seal of the Information Bureau, and the seal  
19 of the East Asia Bureau.

20  
21 "With Regard to the North China Autonomous  
22 Movement

23 "With regard to this subject, the gist of the  
24 editorial in the 'Journal de Shanghai' was reported to  
25 you on 21 Nov. 1935. Its full text is hereby forward-  
ed to you for your reference."

1 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

2 Q Now, whichever bureau got these newspaper  
3 reports first, did not you study them?

4 A I am quite sure that our bureau did see them.

5 Q And, did you not report to Foreign Minister  
6 HIROTA on their contents?

7 A I don't recall exactly. However, even if we  
8 didn't report it direct to the Foreign Minister, I am  
9 sure we did report it to the Vice Minister.

10 Q That was the accused SMIGEMITSU, wasn't it?

11 A Yes.

12 Q And, have you forgotten that the reports con-  
13 tained all the matters which I was asking you about  
14 this morning?

15 A Since the reports were -- since these reports  
16 reached a large number, it is difficult for me to  
17 recall at this date just exactly what their contents  
18 were, these newspaper and telegraphic reports.

19 Q Did you not know, either from the newspapers  
20 or from your consuls, the three matters I asked you  
21 about this morning?

22 A May I have those three things repeated?

23 Q I will remind you. Did you not know, either  
24 from the Evening Post of 18 November 1935 or from your  
25 consular reports, that General DOHIHARA had announced

1 that if the autonomy for the North was not proclaimed  
2 he was prepared to send five Japanese divisions into  
3 Hopeh and six into Shantung?

4 A It is not in my recollection at all.  
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1 You will find it in the file, if you look for  
2 it.

3 Did you not know, either from the Evening Post  
4 of November 20, 1935, or from your consuls that General  
5 DOHIHARA had announced that the ultimatum given to the  
6 North China authorities would expire at noon the next  
7 day?

8 A It is not in my recollection.

9 Q Was that not one of the ultimatums to which you  
10 were referring in paragraph 8 of your affidavit?

11 A Of course, it does include that ultimatum.  
12 However, I do not know about the details of the events  
13 occurring in those times -- in those days. I did not  
14 know at the time of events occurring then.

15 Q Did you not know, either from the Daily News  
16 of November 20, 1935, or from your consuls, that General  
17 DOHIHARA about that date informed the newspapermen that  
18 he expected a formal announcement of the new regime  
19 by the Chinese authorities shortly?

20 A I have no recollection.

21 Q The particular Daily News I am referring to is  
22 the Los Angeles Daily News.

23 Now, do you say that it wasn't part of the  
24 policy of the Foreign Ministry to support the Army in  
25 this move for compelling the Chinese to establish an



1 autonomous government in North China?

2 A It was not.

3 Q On or about the 19th of November, 1935, did  
4 not Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU have an interview with  
5 Mr. Ting who, I think, was a member of the Chinese  
6 Embassy in Japan?

7 THE MONITOR: Mr. Prosecutor, how do you spell  
8 Ting, T-i-n-g?

9 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes.

10 THE PRESIDENT: Have you finished that question,  
11 Mr. Comyns Carr?

12 MR. COMYNS CARR: For the moment, your Honor.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

14 MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, we object  
15 to that as being outside the scope of the direct exam-  
16 ination of this -- direct testimony of this witness.

17 THE PRESIDENT: He covered very fully the  
18 operations of the accused HIROTA as Foreign Minister.  
19 Now he is dealing with what was done by the Vice-Minister.

20 Wasn't SHIGEMITSU the Vice-Minister at the  
21 same time as HIROTA was Foreign Minister?

22 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes, your Honor.

23 MR. FURNESS: I don't think he was at all times,  
24 sir.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Wasn't he so in November, 1935?

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes, your Honor.

2 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is overruled.

3 BY MR. COMYNS CARR (Continued):

4 Q Do you remember that interview?

5 A Can you tell me what the interview was about?  
6 I may be able to recall.

7 Q Did it not follow upon a message received by  
8 HIROTA from the Chinese Ambassador, Mr. Chiang, to the  
9 effect that it was the profound desire of the Nanking  
10 Government to have a sound and sincere promotion of the  
11 negotiations for the improvement of Sino-Japanese  
12 relations?

13 A Are you asking me if I know about the cir-  
14 cumstances in which Consular Ting or Charge D'affaires  
15 Ting brough this message to the Foreign Minister?

16 Q What I was asking you was whether he didn't  
17 bring such a message on the 18th of November, and  
18 whether he didn't have an interview with SHIGEMITSU  
19 following that on the 19th?

20 A I don't recall.

21 Q Did not SHIGEMITSU say to Ting that he wanted  
22 to caution China, particularly about her activities in  
23 North China?

24 A I do not know.

25 Q And did he not say that the Chinese people in

1 North China might have distinct political and economic  
2 ambitions?

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

4 MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, this  
5 witness has already stated repeatedly that he is ignorant  
6 of the meeting about which he is being questioned at  
7 the moment and, in our submission, I can't see that  
8 asking him further questions along the line followed by  
9 my learned friend is being very helpful.

10 THE PRESIDENT: He professes to know so much  
11 about HIROTA's operations as Foreign Minister, that I  
12 think he might be subjected to a little pressure.

13 Q Did not that represent the policy of HIROTA?

14 A As I already stated this morning, I am convinced  
15 that Mr. HIROTA's China policy consisted of an endeavor  
16 to effectuate conciliation and cooperation between the  
17 two nations and in the meantime to avoid -- to take  
18 steps to prevent the Army in China taking such action  
19 as would prevent such conciliation.

20 Q See, I am suggesting to you that on the contrary  
21 the Foreign Ministry, you, HIROTA and SHIGEMITSU, were  
22 yourselves pushing this policy and using this Army's  
23 threats in order to get it adopted.

24 A That is absolutely not so.  
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1 Q Would it be right for SHIGEMITSU to say  
2 that it might be true to some extent, that this was  
3 the result of a Japanese plot?

4 A I cannot believe so.

5 Q Would it be in accordance with HIROTA's  
6 policy for SHIGEMITSU to say this to Mr. Ting, that  
7 for North China to meet her development properly she  
8 must strive for the harmonious rapprochement of  
9 Japan, China and Manchukuo?

10 A It goes without saying that of course it was  
11 necessary that Sino-Japanese conciliation be effective  
12 not only in North China but all over China, and  
13 especially since North China bordered the State of  
14 Manchukuo, that was all the more so.

15 Q Did SHIGEMITSU complain that the Nanking  
16 Government was assembling troops on the Shanghai-Kuan  
17 Hopeh line in an effort to oppose Japan?

18 THE PRESIDENT: Major Furness.

19 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, I happen  
20 to know what document Mr. Comyns Carr is cross-  
21 examining from. I happen to know, further, that what  
22 he just stated is an absolute misquotation of that  
23 document. I think it is most unfair to this witness  
24 and to the defendants in the dock.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr?

1 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, in my sub-  
2 mission it will be time enough for my friend to make  
3 observations like that when the document is tendered  
4 in evidence.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he can always examine  
6 the witness himself.

7 We do not know what document you are using.  
8 You may be using some other source of information,  
9 for all we know.

10 MR. FURNESS: I will say, then, that I am  
11 confident that he is examining from the so-called  
12 HARADA-SAIONJI Memoirs.

13 THE PRESIDENT: You can clear up anything  
14 that has been misrepresented later when you examine  
15 the witness, Major Furness.

16 Q Did Mr. Ting deny the truth of that sug-  
17 gestion?

18 A As I have repeatedly told you, I do not  
19 remember at all about this so-called conversation  
20 between Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU and Councillor Ting,  
21 and therefore I am sorry I can tell you nothing about  
22 it.

23 Q You were in constant touch, I suppose, with  
24 Vice-Minister SHIGEMITSU as well as with HIROTA, were  
25 you not?



1 A Yes.

2 Q Would this represent the policy of both of  
3 them? "I would like to have the army make an autonomy  
4 statement today."

5 THE INTERPRETER: Will you repeat that state-  
6 ment, please?

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: "I would like to have the  
8 army make an autonomy statement today." It was a  
9 statement with regard to autonomy for North China.

10 I will go on before you answer.

11 Q "I would like to send the Kwantung Army  
12 into Shanghaikuan and Hopeh to put a scare into them,  
13 and to have the army make an autonomous statement as  
14 soon as possible. I would like to have everything  
15 done the way the army wants it before the Emperor  
16 returns."

17 MR. FURNESS: If the Court please, I also  
18 have this document, which in fact is the same docu-  
19 ment, before me.

20 THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you should  
21 read it now. As I said before, you will be able to  
22 examine the witness. This document is not in evidence  
23 and we have no way of checking it until it is. We are  
24 handicapped. I understand it is the SAIONJI Diary --  
25 the HARADA Diary.

1 MR. FURNESS: It is, in this case, mis-  
2 translated, sir.

3 THE PRESIDENT: You have full liberty to  
4 refer any document like that which you say is mis-  
5 translated to Major Moore.

6 MR. FURNESS: It is not in evidence, your  
7 Honor, and I am not sure that I intend to cross-  
8 examine this witness on a conference which he says  
9 he knows nothing about.

10 THE PRESIDENT: In all events we cannot  
11 clear up the question between you at this stage be-  
12 cause the document is not in evidence, but it is the  
13 wish of every Member that you should allow the cross-  
14 examination to proceed as regards this phase, Major  
15 Furness. If the document were in evidence, we would  
16 have no difficulty.

17 MR. FURNESS: By my silence, if your Honor  
18 please, I do not wish to have it inferred that I  
19 admit that this document is admissible.  
20

21 Q Now, will you answer the question, Witness,  
22 whether those statements did not represent the real  
23 policy of the Foreign Office, that is to say of both  
24 HIROTA and SHIGEMITSU?

25 A As I have already told you, I know nothing  
about the reported conversation between Vice-Minister

SHIGEMITSU and Councillor Ting.

1 Q One moment -- this has nothing to do with  
2 that conversation. What I am suggesting to you is  
3 now another statement by SHIGEMITSU to Baron HARADA on  
4 the same day, the 19th of November.

5 A And I am convinced that Mr. SHIGEMITSU could  
6 never have made such a statement.

7 Q Did not HIROTA himself say on the same day  
8 that he would like to have the decoration in North  
9 China, that is the autonomy decoration, issued at  
10 such a time that it would not aggravate the Nanking  
11 Government?

12 A No, I have never heard him make such a  
13 statement.

14 Q Now, only one other matter, I think, that I  
15 need ask you about. I will just be sure. Oh, no,  
16 there are two.

17 You say, in paragraph 13 of your affidavit,  
18 that meanwhile, that is, during the same period when  
19 this North China autonomy business was going on,  
20 that the negotiations for the improvement of Sino-  
21 Japanese relations were making steady progress.

22 A By "meanwhile" I did not mean during the same  
23 period while the negotiations for the autonomy move-  
24 ment were going on, but meanwhile, in a general sort  
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1 of way. I just meant to say that the relations  
2 between Japan and China continued to improve in a  
3 general sort of way.  
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1 Q Was HIROTA as anxious as ever to improve them  
2 at the end of December, 1935?

3 A Yes.

4 Q Did the Nanking Government express at that time  
5 an earnest desire to talk matters over and to open a  
6 Nanking conference?

7 A At the time the Kuomintang government of  
8 China said it was prepared to accept HIROTA's principles  
9 as the basis of negotiations, but that because of various  
10 incidents breaking out in North China it was very diffi-  
11 cult to continue negotiations. I received this report in  
12 a telegram.

13 Q For whom was it difficult to continue them,  
14 the Chinese Government or the Japanese Government?

15 A Since it was the Chinese Government that was  
16 making this representation, of course it was difficult  
17 for the Chinese Government to continue the negotiations,  
18 and if it was difficult for the Chinese side it was diffi-  
19 cult at least for those officials of the Japanese Govern-  
20 ment who were actually conducting the negotiations, that  
21 is to say, the Foreign Office and our diplomatic repre-  
22 sentatives in China.

23 Q But if the Chinese Government were willing in  
24 spite of what had happened in North China to continue the  
25 negotiations, why was HIROTA not willing?



1 A I have no recollection that HIROTA was not  
2 willing.

3 Q Did you not say that he was hesitating about  
4 giving China any decisive reply?

5 A I have never heard such a thing.

6 Q And that his reply to them was, "Let us con-  
7 sider this matter only after anti-Japanese movements are  
8 well under control"?

9 A May I ask you what this matter pertains to?

10 Q The proposal made by the Chinese Government for  
11 a Nanking conference.

12 A Mr. HIROTA never told me that he was not will-  
13 ing to continue negotiations with China unless anti-Jap-  
14 anese movements were given up, nor have I myself ever heard  
15 of any such thing.

16 Q Now a question about paragraph 23 of your affi-  
17 davit.

18 You say that the Foreign Office was anchoring  
19 its hope upon the future development of negotiations  
20 when there broke out the so-called Suiyuan Incident  
21 owing to the activities of a part of the Kwantung Army  
22 in Inner Mongolia. That was in December, 1936, when  
23 HIROTA was the premier, wasn't it?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Did you know the premier's, HIROTA's, attitude

1 with regard to the Suiyuan matter?

2 A I do know that HIROTA regretted exceedingly  
3 the outbreak of this incident.

4 Q Would this correctly represent it? "Probably  
5 a military operation will be impossible in the Suiyuan  
6 area due to the weather conditions. Therefore I want the  
7 problem settled diplomatically. We should have the deter-  
8 mination to take action in the event that the Chinese  
9 Central Army should enter Chahar."

10 Was that a correct representation of HIROTA's  
11 real views about this Suiyuan Incident?

12 A I being a bureau chief in the Foreign Ministry,  
13 have never expressed my views directly to Mr. HIROTA,  
14 who had then already become premier.

15 THE INTERPRETER: I being a mere bureau chief  
16 of the Foreign Ministry, never asked Mr. HIROTA about  
17 his opinion concerning the Suiyuan Incident; but it is  
18 my view that since Mr. HIROTA while Foreign Minister had  
19 striven so earnestly for Japanese-Chinese rapprochement  
20 it was but natural that he would try to solve the Suiyuan  
21 and Chahar Incident also through peaceful diplomatic ne-  
22 gotiations.

23 Q Suiyuan is in Inner Mongolia, isn't it --  
24 part of the territory which you called Inner Mongolia?  
25

A Yes.

Q Did not the Japanese establish in that area an independent regime under Prince Teh?

A I have never heard to this date to what extent the Japanese Government was concerned, if it was concerned at all, with the affairs of the Mongolia autonomous regime. But I have heard that the Kwantung Army did have considerable interest in this regime from the viewpoint of maintaining peace and order in Manchuria and also from other viewpoints.

Q Was one of the other viewpoints that it was a convenient place from which to attack Outer Mongolia?

A I do not make my statement with that in mind. From the viewpoint of maintaining peace and order in Mongolia, yes, but as to the other viewpoints, I stated them in a general way because I did not know what they were.

Q Now I am suggesting to you that that was one of them.

A I don't know anything about this matter.

Q Would it correctly represent the policy of HIROTA's government to say that a subordinate of Prince Teh had made a secret overture to the Chinese Central Army and therefore HIROTA did not think that the combat morale of the enemy would be very high?

A From the information I obtained at the time

1 and from the observations I was able to make, I gathered  
2 that the Japanese Government and the central military  
3 authorities knew nothing about this incident right up  
4 to the moment when it actually occurred, and I still  
5 believe so.  
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1 Q When do you say it did actually occur?

2 A The first time I heard about -- the first  
3 news I heard of this incident was that the Inner Mon-  
4 golian troops had invaded Eastern Chahar from Suiyuan  
5 and had there suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of  
6 the Chinese Nationalist Army.

7 Q I am asking you when you say you first heard  
8 about this incident. Can you give the date?

9 A I cannot tell you the exact date since I have  
10 no exact recollection.

11 Q These Inner Mongolian troops that you speak  
12 of were working, were they not, in conjunction with the  
13 Kwantung Army?

14 A As far as I know the Kwantung Army itself  
15 did not participate in this battle.

16 Q Would you answer the question: Were not  
17 these so-called Inner Mongolian troops operating in  
18 conjunction with the Kwantung Army?

19 A I took your question to mean that you were  
20 asking me whether the Kwantung Army cooperated with  
21 the Inner Mongolian Army in fighting the Chinese. Is  
22 that so?

23 Q Now will you answer it?

24 A I have never heard anything to that effect.

25 Q Now, the last matter: Let me repeat to you



1 the first question I put to you and will you tell me  
2 now whether you do not agree that it represented HIROTA's  
3 policy from the beginning. "We will expand our utmost  
4 by foreign policy, and when foreign policy arrives at  
5 its limits we will leave the matter to you, the Army  
6 and Navy, for your disposal." Wasn't that, as shown by  
7 subsequent events, his real policy?

8 A All of us in the Foreign Office from HIROTA  
9 down were convinced that we should strive to remove the  
10 obstacles which the Army was constantly putting in the  
11 way of effecting diplomatic negotiations with China  
12 and to try to settle outstanding issues with that  
13 country through diplomatic negotiations, and we were  
14 convinced that these negotiations would bear fruit.

15 MR. COMYNS CARR: That concludes my cross-  
16 examination, your Honor. Before I leave the lectern  
17 I would just like to correct a mistake I am told I  
18 made on Friday with regard to the matter of the Chinese  
19 Eastern Railway. Contrary to what I then said, it is  
20 a part of the case for the prosecution that the pro-  
21 vocative and subversive acts of the Japanese in con-  
22 nection with that railway began from the time when the  
23 Japanese first came into Manchukuo. Therefore, if my  
24 friend has any further evidence which he desires to  
25 present on that point, we shall not object to it.

1 THE PRESIDENT: Wasn't there a question as  
2 to whether the sale was under duress?

3 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes, your Honor, in the  
4 sense of being instigated or contributed to by pro-  
5 vocative acts on the sea.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

7 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I have one question to ask  
8 of the witness.

9 REDIRECT EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO:

11 Q To the last question put to you by the prose-  
12 cutor, Mr. Witness, you replied that the Foreign Office  
13 did its best to eliminate all the obstacles put for-  
14 ward by the Army in the way of peaceful negotiations.  
15 Now, Mr. Witness, did MINAMI, according to you, consti-  
16 tute one of those obstacles?

17 A I did not mean to limit my answer by any  
18 means to an individual such as General -- to any  
19 specific individual such as General MINAMI.

20 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, I think we ought  
21 to object to this line of re-examination. My friend  
22 has cross-examined the witness once on this subject  
23 already, and I am not aware that the witness has said  
24 anything fresh with regard to MINAMI under cross-  
25 examination.

1 THE PRESIDENT: The question does not sug-  
2 gest that he did, but it does suggest MINAMI may be  
3 included.

4 MR. COMYNS CARR: Yes, your Honor, but that  
5 was in the original affidavit, and my friend has al-  
6 ready cross-examined about it. There is nothing fresh.

7 THE PRESIDENT: The question wasn't required  
8 to explain anything arising out of the cross-examina-  
9 tion.

10 MR. T. OKAMOTO: If the purport of the prose-  
11 cutor's question does not include MINAMI and if the  
12 answer of the witness did not include MINAMI among  
13 those who were constituted obstacles to the negotia-  
14 tions, I shall readily withdraw the question.

15 THE PRESIDENT: He did not say that he did  
16 not include him originally. I am referring to para-  
17 graph 8 of the affidavit, but the cross-examination  
18 has not worsened your position in that regard.

19 MR. COMYNS CARR: My friend having already  
20 cross-examined the witness is, in our submission, not  
21 entitled to re-examine him. The most he could be  
22 entitled to do would be to present further cross-  
23 examination on some new matter stated by the witness  
24 in the course of this cross-examination.

25 MR. T. OKAMOTO: In accordance with the

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20 cross-examined the witness is, in our submission, not  
21 entitled to re-examine him. The most he could be  
22 entitled to do would be to present further cross-  
23 examination on some new matter stated by the witness  
24 in the course of this cross-examination.

25 MR. T. OKAMOTO: In accordance with the

wishes of the Tribunal I shall withdraw the question.

1 MR. KATO: Counsel KATO representing the  
2 defendant DOHIHARA. I have one or two points that I  
3 wish to clear up with this witness in cross-examina-  
4 tion.

5 RECROSS-EXAMINATION

6 BY MR. KATO:

7 Q In paragraph 12 of your affidavit, Mr. Wit-  
8 ness, you refer to the East Hopei Autonomous Govern-  
9 ment under Yin Ju-keng and the Hopei-Chahar Political  
10 Council of Sung Cheh-yuan. You further state that the  
11 Japanese Foreign Ministry -- although the Japanese  
12 Foreign Ministry was opposed to the East Hopei  
13 Autonomous Government it was not particularly opposed  
14 to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. Now, I wish  
15 to ask of you, Mr. Witness, the differences, if there are  
16 any, in policies or doctrines entertained by those  
17 two regimes.

18 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Carr.

19 MR. COMYNS CARR: In my submission, your  
20 Honor, that doesn't arise out of any cross-examination  
21 by me or the evidence in chief.

22 MR. KATO: I am testing the witness' credi-  
23 bility.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Objection upheld.  
25



1 MR. KATO: I will pass on to the next ques-  
2 tion.

3 Q Then do you know, Mr. Witness, as to the mo-  
4 tive as well as the outcome brought about -- motive for  
5 establishment of the North China Political Council and  
6 the Sung Cheh-yuan and its outcome?

7 MR. COMYNS CARR: I make the same objection,  
8 your Honor.

9 Q (Continuing) Did the accused DOHIHARA have  
10 anything to do with the establishment -- the setting up  
11 of the East Hopei Autonomous Government?

12 A I have never heard that DOHIHARA had anything  
13 to do with the East Hopei Regime.

14 MR. KATO: That is all, your Honor.

15 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
16 minutes.

17 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was  
18 taken until 1500, after which the proceed-  
19 ings were resumed as follows:)  
20  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

4 MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, there  
5 will be no further examination of this witness on  
6 behalf of the accused HIROTA. May we request his  
7 release on the usual terms?

8 THE PRESIDENT: He is released accordingly.

9 (Whereupon, the witness was excused.)

10 MR. YAMAOKA: We next offer in evidence  
11 defense document 2220. This is an official document  
12 of the Japanese Foreign Office compiled in May 1934  
13 by the Bureau of Asiatic Affairs. It gives a resume  
14 of important problems pending between Japan and  
15 China which had been solved through the efforts of  
16 Mr. HIROTA in an effort gradually to improve over-  
17 all relations between the two countries.

18 We do not intend to read this document;  
19 however, at the same time we desire to delete from  
20 it paragraphs one to three, inclusive, for the reason  
21 that the matters therein contained relate to events  
22 prior to Mr. HIROTA's assumption of office as Foreign  
23 Minister.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

25 MR. COMYNS CARR: Prosecution objects, your



1 Honor, to the remainder of the document on the ground  
2 that it contains a lot of detailed information about  
3 some very minor matters which appear to have been  
4 settled by negotiation between the Japanese and  
5 Chinese governments and is sufficiently referred to  
6 in the affidavit of the last witness in paragraph 4,  
7 the first two sentences. In our submission, it is  
8 unnecessary to cumber the record, even though it is  
9 not to be read, with small matters like this in detail.

10 MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, we  
11 respectfully submit that this substantiates the testi-  
12 mony of the last witness.

13 THE PRESIDENT: That part of the affidavit  
14 was not contested in the cross-examination, if I  
15 recollect rightly; that is to say, the first two sen-  
16 tences of paragraph 4.

17 MR. YAMAOKA: That may be so, if your Honor  
18 please. On the other hand, I desire to point out that  
19 Counts 1 to 5 of the Indictment, that is, the conspir-  
20 acy counts, and also Appendix A, Section 3, of the  
21 Indictment do indicate that these economic matters  
22 are of importance.

23 THE PRESIDENT: It seems to be repetitive,  
24 Mr. Yamaoka; unnecessary details of what is already  
25 stated in the affidavit of the last witness and not

1 contested. I do not think any Member wants to admit  
2 it.

3 MR. YAMAOKA: For the purpose of the record,  
4 may I have it rejected then?

5 THE PRESIDENT: The objection is sustained  
6 and the document rejected.

7 MR. YAMAOKA: We next offer in evidence  
8 defense document 2215. This is a telegram from  
9 Consul-General SUMA to Mr. HIROTA as Minister for  
10 Foreign Affairs on April 20, 1934.

11 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Comyns Carr.

12 MR. COMYNS CARR: Your Honor, a summary of  
13 this document occupies the remainder of paragraph 4  
14 of the last witness' affidavit and although I cross-  
15 examined about matters arising out of one sentence of  
16 that affidavit I did not challenge the accuracy of  
17 the summary of the document and the document contains  
18 nothing of importance beyond what is in the summary.  
19

20 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Yamaoka.

21 MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, in our  
22 submission this is an important telegram showing the  
23 commencement of the discussions between Foreign Minister  
24 Wang and Foreign Minister HIROTA.

25 THE PRESIDENT: Is it not sufficiently covered  
by the uncontested part of paragraph 4 of that



1 affidavit? It seems to be covered by the last  
2 decision, Mr. Yamaoka.

3 The objection is sustained and the document  
4 rejected by a majority.

5 MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, I had  
6 not quite finished. I did desire to point out that  
7 this document is the basis for the later HIROTA's  
8 three principles and we thought it of sufficient  
9 importance to present it to the Tribunal so that it  
10 would have the benefit of the entire story of how  
11 these negotiations were started by Mr. Wang and that--

12 THE PRESIDENT: I think, in view of what  
13 you said, since this is the basis for the three  
14 principles, we will cancel that decision and admit  
15 the document on the usual terms.

16 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2215  
17 will receive exhibit No. 3243.

18 (Whereupon, the document above  
19 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
20 No. 3243 and received in evidence.)

21 MR. YAMAOKA: I will read defense exhibit  
22 3243:

23 "Telegram sent from Nanking and received by  
24 the Department of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, on April 20,  
25 1934.



1 "From Consul-General SUMA to HIROTA, the  
2 Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3 "No. 368 (Confidential)

4 "Following is addressed to you from Minister  
5 ARIYOSHI.

6 "On the eighteenth when I saw Wang Ching-wei,  
7 in continuation of the talks reported by telegrams  
8 No. 366 and No. 367 sent to Your Excellency through  
9 the Consul-General, Nanking, I had conversation with  
10 him as follows:

11 "1. I told Wang that it is a matter of  
12 satisfaction that the conversation on the subject  
13 of radio communication between Japan and China has  
14 already been started and that negotiation on this  
15 matter is making amicable progress. If we make pro-  
16 gress in settling other questions successively in  
17 this manner and thereby demonstrate by facts the res-  
18 toration of the relations between our two countries  
19 it will greatly contribute towards the improvement  
20 of the situation. I further explained to him the  
21 peaceful policy taken up by Your Excellency ever since  
22 you have assumed the duties as Minister for Foreign  
23 Affairs. and I explained also the interview which  
24 Your Excellency gave to American correspondents with  
25 regard to Japan's attitude toward China. Then I told

1 him if there be any wish or desire, etc., on his  
2 side which he wants to lay before our side I shall  
3 transmit such to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on  
4 my return to Japan and shall carefully confer with  
5 the Minister.

6 "2. Wang stated that with regard to Foreign  
7 Minister HIROTA's international peace policy he him-  
8 self has great admiration, and, in consequence, he  
9 entertains a desire to take steps on this opportunity  
10 to promote in some way the improvement of the rela-  
11 tions of our two countries. Wang proceeded further,  
12 making introductory remarks that what he states is in  
13 fact not at all in the nature of a diplomatic proposal  
14 but he intends to put it forward by way of consulta-  
15 tion. Then he stated that in order to improve the  
16 relations he thought it would be effective to estab-  
17 lish at this juncture a sort of general principles  
18 between the two countries and to proceed in accordance  
19 with such principles. Such general principles are (1)  
20 that the two countries shall live and let live. And  
21 that such co-prosperity shall be a hundred year policy  
22 of the States and shall not be a temporary one. To  
23 cite an example, if Japan does not treat China in such  
24 manner as England treats India but enters into a rela-  
25 tionship with China which is similar to the relation-



1 ship between Germany and Austria, the co-prosperity  
2 of the two countires will be easily realized. He  
3 thought that by this Japan will be able to profit  
4 more than what England is getting in her relations  
5 with India. (2) Next, the cause of estrangement of  
6 the relations between our two countires at the  
7 present time is the Manchurian question and the posi-  
8 tions maintained by the two countries towards this  
9 question are fundamentally at variance. In view,  
10 however, of the present situation which clearly  
11 shows that any improvement of the situation is impos-  
12 sible without touching this causal question, he would  
13 like to set up a principle that the two countries  
14 shall settle the Manchurian question in the future  
15 in a sincere and peaceful manner. That is, in other  
16 words, to agree to the effect that Japan in the  
17 future will not use force of arms nor will China  
18 counteract to it with forces such as volunteers,  
19 etc., and that both sides will settle the question  
20 in a peaceful way. He then asked my opinion with  
21 regard to the establishment of these two general  
22 principles.

23 "3. Whereupon I stated that with regard to  
24 (1) I had already signified my complete agreement to  
25 his opinion which was expressed at the time of my

1 taking up the present post. Considering from all  
2 angles, there can be no objection that the two coun-  
3 tries should co-exist and co-prosper. As regards (2)  
4 I asked him what does it exactly mean. Then I pro-  
5 ceeded by saying that I have repeatedly stated that  
6 the existence of Manchukuo is a fait accompli admit-  
7 ting of no change. Therefore, if his proposal  
8 touches this fact there can be no room for considera-  
9 tion. I stated the above just to prevent further  
10 complication. Wang said that from the Chinese point  
11 of view ill feeling of the people will not terminate  
12 as long as the Manchurian question remains unsettled.  
13 The situation is such that friendship between China  
14 and Japan, for instance, is being rendered difficult  
15 and in view of the fact that the Chinese people are  
16 making the restoration of Manchuria as the prerequisite  
17 to such friendship, it is necessary to show to them  
18 some guiding basis in the form of principle (2) as  
19 above-mentioned. He further tried to put forward  
20 various roundabout discussions.

21  
22 "4. I told him that I presumed he must be  
23 well aware of the cause of the outbreak of the Man-  
24 churian Incident. Then I reviewed briefly the state  
25 of things which prevailed after the Russo-Japanese  
War, the independent status of Manchuria in the past



1 and wrongs committed by the Chang family, etc., and  
2 stated that it is our earnest hope that China, by  
3 fixing her eyes upon the wide view of East Asia,  
4 will make a clean sweep of the ill feeling in the  
5 past, and, making a step further, will adopt the  
6 policy of co-prosperity of Japan, Manchukuo and China.  
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"5. Wang stated that he understood fully with regard to the circumstances which prevailed in the past. It was his view that although there was a good chance of settling the Manchurian question at the time of the INUKAI Cabinet, the opportunity was lost. He said in the present situation it is impossible for the Chinese people to understand if they are told to shake hands with Japan leaving the situation as it is. The Manchurian question is, so to speak, like a reef in the sea between the two countries. It must be removed. But as it is difficult to remove it now all at once, it was his intention to retain the said reef temporarily as it is and to let the ship go through. That is to say, if the principle as above-mentioned is decided, it will give to the people a basis for entering into friendly relations. Hereupon I repeated Wang's words as above-mentioned in order to call his attention, saying that I understood from what he explained that as the Manchurian question is difficult of settlement it will be reserved as it is, but by the establishment of the principle as above set forth it was his intention to secure a basis to give guidance to the people and thus to open the road for friendship. I told him that as I now understood fully I am going to report the matter in detail to the Japanese Minister for Foreign

1 Affairs and to invite his careful consideration. Wang  
2 stated he had entertained the above opinion for a long  
3 time but refrained from proposing it to this day be-  
4 cause he thought it would only give rise to opposition  
5 and would mer the chance of its success if he had made  
6 public his plan without knowing the prospect of its  
7 realization. If the Japanese side will agree to the  
8 establishment of the above-mentioned principle, he  
9 said he can state that he is confident in carrying it  
10 out on his side. He asked me, bearing the above in my  
11 mind, to make efforts for the realization of the plan.  
12 He also expressed his hope to have early conversation  
13 with me after my return from Japan.  
14

15 "6. In continuation of the above conversation.  
16 I told him that, putting aside the points as above  
17 mentioned, it was necessary for both countries to  
18 remove suspicion and to calm and settle public feeling.  
19 in order to meet the situation which stares us in the  
20 face. In this connection I pointed out it was a mistake  
21 that China hitherto asked help from European and  
22 American countries and adopted the so-called policy  
23 of checking one foreign country by using another.  
24  
25



1 I further pointed out instances of favoring Europeans  
2 and Americans, such as the purchase of aeroplanes, con-  
3 struction of airfields, employment of advisers, etc.,  
4 and gave him warning. To which Wang replied that  
5 China asked for a little help in the past from European  
6 and American quarters, but it was by no means the adop-  
7 tion of the policy of checking one country by using  
8 another. He understood that it displeases Japan to  
9 consult only with European and American countries  
10 without asking Japan's help. At present it is difficult  
11 to shake hands positively with Japan, but hereafter he  
12 would make efforts to get in touch conservatively with  
13 Japan and to try to avoid stimulating ill feeling on  
14 the Japanese side. He again referred to our attitude  
15 with regard to the Fukien Incident and expressed his  
16 hope that Japan will refrain from becoming involved  
17 in such Chinese disturbances in the future as in the  
18 case of the said Incident. He stated that this would  
19 be very effective in giving guidance to the Chinese  
20 people."  
21

22 There is a certificate, which I shall not read.

23 We now offer in evidence defense document  
24 2020. This is a telegram from Foreign Minister HIROTA  
25 to the various Japanese embassies with respect to the  
HIROTA-Lindley conversation on April 25, 1934. That

1 conversation arose out of the situation created by  
2 the unauthorized statement of AMAU given to the press  
3 without the sanction of the Foreign Minister in March  
4 1934.

5 THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brown.

6 MR. BROWN: Your honor, the prosecution objects  
7 to this document. In our submission, if it is desired  
8 to prove this conversation, the correct way is to call  
9 evidence to that effect, which is clearly available,  
10 and this, in our submission, is merely an indirect  
11 way of trying to get this conversation in evidence.

12 MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, we  
13 respectfully submit that this is competent evidence  
14 as it is shown from its face that it is a telegram  
15 sent by Foreign Minister HIROTA to the various  
16 embassies and reports the actual conversation with  
17 Ambassador Lindley.

18 THE PRESIDENT: By a majority, the objection  
19 is overruled and the document is admitted on the  
20 usual terms.

21 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2020  
22 will receive exhibit 3244.

23 (Whereupon, the document above  
24 referred to was marked defense exhibit No.  
25 3244 and received in evidence.)



MR. YAMAOKA: I shall read defense exhibit

3244:

"Sent: April 26, 1934

"To: Embassies in U.S., Great Britain, China, Manchukuo, Peiping; Consulates ( -General) at Tsingtao, Nanking, Foochow, Amoy, Canton, Tientsin, Tsinan, Hongkong, Hankow.

"From: Foreign Minister HIROTA

"Subject: HIROTA-Lindley Conversation on April 25 concerning Problem of Informal Statement.

"Circular No. 460 (Simplified Code)

"1. Ambassador Lindley called on the 25th and read telegraphic instructions from his home Government, the substance of which follows:

"(a) It is presumed that the source of the recent statement is authoritative, and its nature is such that Great Britain is unable to ignore it.

"(b) The Nine-Power Treaty stipulates the equality of rights of the various signatory Powers. Great Britain must insist on these common rights being respected, although it recognizes exceptions where the rights of the signatory Powers are restricted by special agreements such as, for instance, a consortium agreement, or as regards those recognized by the signatory Powers as being special rights of Japan.



1           "(c) Insofar as the statement in question is  
2 motivated by the concern over China's integrity and  
3 peace, it concurs with the aim of Britain's policies.  
4 However, if it is assumed that Japan alone is entitled  
5 to decide what measures are prejudicial, Great Britain  
6 must take exception. Under Articles I and VII of the  
7 Nine-Power Treaty, Japan has the right to invite  
8 attention to the measures of the other signatory  
9 Powers which she considers injurious to her security.  
10 In view of the fact that this right guarantees Japan's  
11 security, it is presumed that the statement in question  
12 does not purport to repudiate the common rights of the  
13 Powers with respect to China or that Japan herself  
14 seeks to violate her treaty obligations.  
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1           "(d) Replying to questions in Parliament, Foreign  
2 Secretary Simon stated that 'it appears that the state-  
3 ment in question was made due to the apprehension that  
4 certain activities of the Powers in China are injur-  
5 ious to peace in the Orient or to Sino-Japanese re-  
6 lations or to China's security, but there is no  
7 reason for such apprehension to arise as far as  
8 Britain's policies are concerned. Britain is, as  
9 a matter of fact, avoiding injurious measures such  
10 as mentioned.' Since it is expected that similar  
11 questions will be made during the week, the British  
12 Government wishes to make inquiries of the Japanese  
13 Government concerning the statement in question in  
14 the most friendly spirit.

15           "2. The Ambassador summarized the main  
16 points of the above instructions as being: (1) not-  
17 withstanding the fact that Japan, under the Nine-  
18 Power Treaty (Articles I and VII), possesses the  
19 right to invite the attention to measures taken by  
20 other signatory Powers which she considers injurious  
21 to peace in the Orient and to China's integrity, why  
22 should she find it necessary to issue a statement of  
23 this nature? (2) if Japan seeks to be the sole judge  
24 as to what constitute injurious measures, it would  
25 be tantamount to be claiming something over and above



1 the equal rights of the Nine-Power Treaty. He added  
2 that the British Government are not by any means  
3 blaming Japan for violations of the said treaty.

4 "3. Accordingly, after stating that I  
5 shall reply to his overtures if I find it necessary  
6 to do so after due study and explaining to him that  
7 the statement in question was not in any way an  
8 official statement in the same way as I had done to  
9 Grew as per my circular telegram No. 459, I requested  
10 clarification on two or three points in his inquiries  
11 in the following manner:

12 "(a) Firstly I stated that: I deeply  
13 appreciate Foreign Secretary Simon's statement in  
14 Parliament that your government will not take any  
15 measures which are injurious to peace in the Orient  
16 and to China's integrity; however, Japan has hither-  
17 to strictly adhered to the Nine-Power Treaty and has  
18 never violated it; she has repeatedly given assur-  
19 ances since the League of Nations conference that  
20 she does not intend to violate it, and it is strange  
21 that at this time other nations should entertain  
22 doubts; in this sense, I find it difficult to under-  
23 stand why your government has referred to the Nine-  
24 Power Treaty and what points of that treaty have come  
25 into question.

1            "To this, Ambassador Lindley answered that,  
2 in short, the statement of the 17th has created the  
3 impression as if Japan was claiming rights in China  
4 over and above the rights which she possesses in  
5 common with the Powers under the Nine-Power Treaty  
6 and that especially her claim for the judgeship as to  
7 whether or not the policies of the Powers are injur-  
8 ious to peace in the Orient and to China's integrity  
9 is a problem.

10           "To my remarks that, after all, the con-  
11 science of the conspirators is the most accurate  
12 judge and that as to claiming rights under the  
13 Nine-Power Treaty over the common rights of the  
14 signatory Powers, it cannot be thought of so long as  
15 that treaty is not denounced, Ambassador Lindley  
16 nodded agreement.

17           "(b) Next, I stated that: Japan respects  
18 the principles of the Open Door and Equal Opportunity  
19 and has no objections whatever to the bona fide  
20 commercial activities of the Powers with China, but  
21 rather, since the situation is such that she does  
22 not enjoy equal opportunity with the Powers due to the  
23 still continuing boycott by China, Japan has even  
24 more reason than the Powers to insist on the ob-  
25 servance of the principles of the Open Door and Equal



1 Opportunity; with respect to investments in China,  
2 while China is neglecting the loan consortium, which  
3 still exists, in view of the present political  
4 situation in China, investments in China will not  
5 only mean money thrown away, as Foreign Secretary  
6 Grey once said, but will give rise to harmful re-  
7 sults for China (the Ambassador added that Britain  
8 will on no account invest in China); furthermore,  
9 while it appears that of late persons claiming to  
10 represent the League (of Nations) or under the  
11 pretext of doing business are pouring into China  
12 and are busily engaged in activities from various  
13 ulterior motives, Japan naturally cannot view such  
14 activities with indifference, and moreover in view  
15 of the geographical relations between China and  
16 Japan, is it not logical for Japan, a neighbor, to  
17 feel greater concern if a fire breaks out in China  
18 than those farther away?

19 "(c) Ambassador Lindley stated that he  
20 understood from my explanations the general situation  
21 and said he would telegraph accordingly to his Govern-  
22 ment immediately.

23 "I told him informally that although I felt  
24 that I had in general answered fully the various  
25 points of his overtures, I shall reply further if,



1 after careful consideration, there should be points  
2 on which such is considered necessary."

3 I will not read later notations, but I in-  
4 vite the Tribunal's attention to the note which says  
5 the telegram is to be relayed to the various embas-  
6 sies at London, Washington, and Brazil, and there-  
7 after to the other branches of the diplomatic service.

8 We next offer in evidence defense document  
9 2021. This is a telegram from Foreign Minister  
10 HIROTA to various Japanese embassies, dated April 26,  
11 1934, with respect to the situation arising out of  
12 the unauthorized Amau statement of March 1934.

13 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

14 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2021  
15 will receive exhibit No. 3245.

16 (Whereupon, the document above  
17 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
18 No. 3245 and received in evidence.)

19 MR. YAMAOKA: I shall read exhibit 3245:

20 "SENT: April 26, 1934.

21 "TO: Embassies in Britain, U. S., China,  
22 Manchukuo; also to Peiping and Nanking.

23 "FROM: Foreign Minister HIROTA.

24 "SUBJECT: Concerning the question of the  
25 Unofficial Announcement.

1 "Circular No. 465 (Code)

2 "Reference my Circular No. 435:

3 "On the 26th, Ambassador Grew called and  
4 stated that he had received a telegram from his home  
5 government to obtain a translation of the unofficial  
6 announcement of the 17th.

7 "I, therefore, explained that the above-  
8 mentioned unofficial announcement not only was not  
9 official in any sense as I said yesterday but was  
10 merely printed in the newspapers from replies made  
11 by the official in charge to various questions asked  
12 by newspaper reporters and that, therefore, there  
13 could be no translation; however, the replies of  
14 the official in charge which appeared in the news-  
15 papers about the 21st (see my telegram Circular  
16 No. 435) generally explained the standpoint of the  
17 Japanese Government. And in accordance with the  
18 Ambassador's request, I handed him a translation  
19 of the gist of the above-mentioned replies as per  
20 separate telegram Circular No. 466.

21 "I handed the (contents of the) separate  
22 telegram also to the British Embassy with the above  
23 explanations. In both cases, it was added that  
24 there was no objection to quoting the contents of  
25 the separate telegram.



1 "Both this and separate telegram to be  
2 relayed:

3 "From the Embassy at London to all ambas-  
4 sadors in Europe except Turkey and to Geneva.

5 "From the Embassy at Washington to New  
6 York."

7 We next offer in evidence defense document  
8 2022, which is self-explanatory.

9 THE PRESIDENT: Admitted on the usual terms.

10 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document  
11 2022 will receive exhibit No. 3246.

12 (Whereupon, the document above  
13 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
14 . 3246 and received in evidence.)

15 MR. YAMAOKA: I shall read exhibit 3246.

16 "SENT: April 26, 1934.

17 "TO: Embassies in Britain, U. S., China,  
18 Manchukuo, Peiping, Consulate-General at Nanking.

19 "FROM: Foreign Minister HIROTA.

20 "SUBJECT: Concerning the question of the  
21 Unofficial Announcement.

22 "No. 466 Circular (Simplified Code).

23 "Separate Telegram.

24 "Japan has not infringed upon China's in-  
25 dependence or interests, nor has she the slightest

1 intention to do so. In fact, she sincerely desires  
2 the preservation of territorial integrity of China  
3 and her unification and prosperity. These ends  
4 should, fundamentally speaking, be attained by  
5 China herself through her self-awakening and  
6 voluntary efforts.

7 "Japan has no intention to trespass upon  
8 the rights of other powers in China. Their bona  
9 fide financial and commercial activities will re-  
10 sult to the benefit of China which is quite  
11 welcome to Japan. She, of course, subscribes to  
12 the principles of the Open Door and Equal Oppor-  
13 tunity in China. She is observing scrupulously  
14 all existing treaties and agreements concerning that  
15 country.

16 "However, Japan cannot remain indifferent  
17 to anyone's taking action under any pretext, which  
18 is prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order  
19 in East Asia for which she, if only in view of her  
20 geographic position, has the most vital concern.  
21 Consequently, she cannot afford to have questions  
22 of China exploited by any third party for the execu-  
23 tion of a selfish policy which does not take into  
24 consideration the above circumstances."  
25

There is a certificate attached which I shall  
not read.



1           We offer in evidence defense document 2018,  
2 which is an address of Mr. HIROTA, as Minister for  
3 Foreign Affairs, at the 67th session of the Imperial  
4 Diet on January 22, 1935.

5           THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Brown.

6           MR. BROWN: Your Honor, the prosecution  
7 objects to this document on the ground that it is  
8 merely repetitive. It contains another discussion of  
9 Japan's foreign policy, of her peaceful intentions in  
10 her relations with other countries, and states that  
11 the future progress of Manchukuo will depend on cooper-  
12 ation with Japan. It also discusses naval disarmament  
13 and states that the Washington Treaty has become  
14 incompatible and makes references to the question of  
15 arms limitation; also references to the relations exist-  
16 ing with Russia. The conditions in China are deplored,  
17 and there is the statement that Japan is not receiving  
18 the treatment to which she is entitled in foreign trade  
19 with the world.  
20

21           It is suggested by the prosecution that all  
22 this is repetitive.

23           MR. YAMAOKA: If the Tribunal please, in our  
24 submission this address of Mr. HIROTA as Foreign  
25 Minister is not repetitive.

          THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything new in it?



1 MR. YAMAOKA: In this respect, if I may say  
2 so, if your Honors please: The rule as to repetitive-  
3 ness, as I understand it, applies where there is an  
4 accumulation of evidence on the same matter, on one  
5 incident, let us say.

6 THE PRESIDENT: Where the subsequent documents  
7 add nothing to the earlier ones and are no stronger;  
8 I think that would be the way to put it.

9 MR. YAMAOKA: I am quite well aware of the  
10 fact that the subject matter of this document is very  
11 similar to the previous speeches made by Mr. HIROTA as  
12 Foreign Minister in the Diet.

13 THE PRESIDENT: We had his speeches in the  
14 Diet along the same line, didn't we?

15 MR. YAMAOKA: Yes, it is quite true, your  
16 Honor. But we do not have his speech of this date.  
17 In other words, we are endeavoring to show that during  
18 the course of Mr. HIROTA's career in the Japanese  
19 Government, he said such a thing on such a day; that  
20 he said another thing on another day; and to show the  
21 consistency of his position throughout. And we intend,  
22 as your Honors have no doubt--

23 THE PRESIDENT: I think a majority will admit  
24 it is, but they are not anxious that the whole should  
25 be read. It may be you can cut it down. It is admitted

on the usual terms. The objection is overruled.

1 CLERK OF THE COURT: Defense document 2018  
2 will receive exhibit No. 3247.

3 (Whereupon, the document above  
4 referred to was marked defense exhibit  
5 No. 3247 and received in evidence.)

6 MR. YAMAOKA: I desire to announce, if the  
7 Tribunal please, that I do not intend to read page 1  
8 of this exhibit--

9 THE PRESIDENT: Page 8 probably contains all  
10 that is material.

11 MR. YAMAOKA: --including the first line of  
12 page 2.

13 THE PRESIDENT: We will leave it to your  
14 judgment.

15 MR. YAMAOKA: Thank you, sir. I shall read  
16 from the first paragraph of page 2.

17 "The Japanese Government are paying particular  
18 attention to the naval disarmament question. I had  
19 occasion at the last session to speak about the Prelim-  
20 inary Naval Conversation which took place in London  
21 between Japan, Great Britain, and the United States of  
22 America. The fundamental policy of the Japanese  
23 Government in the present negotiations is, as I then  
24 explained in full, to carry out a sweeping reduction of  
25



1 armaments and to effect a total abolition or a drastic  
2 limitation of the offensive arms, so as to free each  
3 power from the menace of the other powers and, in fact,  
4 to make it impossible for any power to menace another.  
5 The Washington Treaty of Naval Limitation of 1922,  
6 having now become incompatible with our basic policy,  
7 our government notified the Government of the United  
8 States on December 29 last year of Japan's intention  
9 to terminate that treaty in accordance with its provi-  
10 sions. In consequence, the Washington Treaty will cease  
11 to be in force as from the last day of December 1936.  
12 This step must not be taken to mean that we intend to  
13 launch out on any expansion of our armaments, which  
14 is far from our thought. On the contrary, we look for-  
15 ward to the conclusion of another pact to supersede  
16 the Washington Treaty -- a pact based on a new formula  
17 which shall be truly consonant with the spirit of  
18 disarmament. The Preliminary Conversations, which  
19 afforded the powers an opportunity to discuss tho-  
20 roughly all relevant matters and to make known their  
21 respective views more or less definitely, was adjourned  
22 on December 20, as it was then deemed advisable to  
23 enable the delegates of the powers to consult their  
24 home governments on the results of the conversations  
25 so far attained. It was arranged, however, that a close

1 contact should be maintained between the powers  
2 during the recess, and that the negotiations should  
3 be reopened as soon as a proper moment arrives. We  
4 sincerely hope for, and are devoting our best efforts  
5 to bring about, an early resumption of these negotiations  
6 for the achievement of a new equitable agreement which  
7 will embody the principles of non-aggression and non-  
8 menace and effect an actual and sweeping armament  
9 reduction, and advance thereby the cause of world peace.

10 "Japan and the United States have been bound  
11 not only by a vital economic relationship of mutual  
12 interdependence unparalleled elsewhere, but also by  
13 a historical bond of friendship ever since the com-  
14 mencement of their intercourse. There exists no ques-  
15 tion between the two countries which is intrinsically  
16 difficult of an amicable solution. Certainly, it is  
17 unimaginable that there should be any cause of con-  
18 flict between the two countries separated by the vast  
19 expanse of the Pacific. As for our former ally, Great  
20 Britain, while it is true that in order to safeguard our  
21 oversea trade, we have yet to discuss various matters  
22 with that country, I cannot think of any part of the  
23 globe, where the adjustment of interests between us  
24 might be considered in any way unattainable. It is  
25 needless to say that good understanding and cooperation



1 between Japan and Great Britain constitute really an  
2 important contribution to the peace of the world.

3 "It is consideration of these relationships  
4 that the Japanese Government have carried on negotia-  
5 tions with America and with Great Britain in accordance  
6 with the spirit expressed above. And it is in the spirit  
7 of this policy that we wish to deal with all other  
8 countries, especially with our neighbor states with  
9 which we are anxious to foster good will and fraternal  
10 sentiments without any mutual menace.

11 "We have been guided wholly by the same spirit  
12 in all our negotiations with the Soviet Union. The  
13 pending negotiations on the transfer of the North  
14 Manchuria Railway have made further progress since I  
15 last spoke and it will not perhaps be long before an  
16 agreement is reached. If the transfer serves to elimi-  
17 nate the source of such disputes as have occurred  
18 hitherto so frequently along that railway, and to  
19 strengthen the friendship between Japan, Manchoukuo  
20 and the Soviet Union, the prime objective of the  
21 present negotiations will have been attained. Our  
22 government are planning to accelerate the peaceful  
23 development of Soviet-Japanese relations by redoubling  
24 their efforts for the solution of other pending prob-  
25 lems. To that end a hearty cooperation on the part



1 of the Soviet Union is, of course, essential. In this  
2 connection, I cannot but hope that the Soviet Govern-  
3 ment will give special consideration to the erection  
4 of military works in the Far East, especially along  
5 the Soviet-Manchoukuo frontiers, with a view to promoting  
6 mutual trust and assurance.

7 "Of late, the political situation in China  
8 has been somewhat quiet. That, except for the fighting  
9 between the communist armies and the government troops,  
10 there is no civil war there at present is most grati-  
11 fying not only for China herself but for the sake of  
12 the peace of East Asia, with which Japan is most vitally  
13 concerned. However, it cannot be denied, if only in  
14 the light of history alone that in the Chinese political  
15 situation many serious possibilities are still latent.  
16 While fortunately the main strength of the Red armies  
17 in the direction of Kiangsi and Fukien appears to have  
18 been driven away from those territories by the expedi-  
19 tionary forces sent by the government, the remaining  
20 units of these armies are said to be establishing con-  
21 tact with their allies in Kueichow and Szechwan and  
22 thereabouts and moving westward into the remoter regions.  
23 In view of this fact, coupled with the reports of the  
24 Sovietization of Sinkiang, the Japanese Government will  
25 be obliged to continue to watch with concern the

1 activities of the Communist Party and armies in China.  
2 Again, it is to be regretted that even now in certain  
3 localities of China the anti-Japanese agitation has  
4 not yet been completely brought to an end. Japan  
5 attaches great importance to her friendship with other  
6 states in East Asia and counts on their participation  
7 in bearing the serious responsibilities for the main-  
8 tenance of peace and order in this part of the world.  
9 I fervently hope, therefore, and only that China will  
10 soon recover her stability, but that she will awake  
11 to the realization of the whole situation of East Asia  
12 and undertake to meet the genuine aspirations of our  
13 country. In view of our position as China's neighbor  
14 and a stabilizing force in East Asia it is our policy  
15 to try to assist China in the attainment of this goal.  
16 I may add that the Japanese Government are glad to  
17 acknowledge the fact that, as has been indicated in  
18 the gradual solution of various long-pending questions,  
19 there is today a growing trend among the Chinese people  
20 to appreciate the true motive of Japan. While we will  
21 do everything to encourage this tendency, I hope that  
22 China will collaborate with us further in that  
23 direction.  
24

25 "Now turning to Japan's trade relations, I  
am sorry to state that the policy of trade restriction



activities of the Communist Party and armies in China. Again, it is to be regretted that even now in certain localities of China the anti-Japanese agitation has not yet been completely brought to an end. Japan attaches great importance to her friendship with other states in East Asia and counts on their participation in bearing the serious responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and order in this part of the world. I fervently hope, therefore, and only that China will soon recover her stability, but that she will awake to the realization of the whole situation of East Asia and undertake to meet the genuine aspirations of our country. In view of our position as China's neighbor and a stabilizing force in East Asia it is our policy to try to assist China in the attainment of this goal. I may add that the Japanese Government are glad to acknowledge the fact that, as has been indicated in the gradual solution of various long-pending questions, there is today a growing trend among the Chinese people to appreciate the true motive of Japan. While we will do everything to encourage this tendency, I hope that China will collaborate with us further in that direction.

"Now turning to Japan's trade relations, I am sorry to state that the policy of trade restriction

1 exemplified in the promulgation of high customs tariffs,  
2 import restrictions, exchange control and exchange  
3 compensation duties, etc., is as prevalent as ever  
4 among foreign countries, some of which have even gone  
5 so far as to abrogate their commercial treaties with  
6 our country. Such a situation is extremely regrettable  
7 not only for the sake of Japan but also from the broader  
8 viewpoint of the world's economic rehabilitation. Our  
9 government are endeavoring to come to a fair agreement  
10 with each one of the powers concerned in order to  
11 have such measures of trade restriction either modified  
12 or removed as far as possible and to promote the mutual  
13 interests of both. For a country like Japan with a  
14 vast population on the one hand and meagre natural  
15 resources on the other, foreign trade constitutes an  
16 important peaceful means of livelihood. The advance  
17 of Japanese commodities on the markets of the world  
18 today is only the fruit of our nation's united and  
19 indefatigable labors for many long years. Of course,  
20 we are resorting to no unfair devices for the expansion  
21 of our trade, while the development of our industries  
22 confers substantial benefits on many countries which  
23 produce raw material, and at the same time ministers  
24 directly to the welfare of multitudes of consumers  
25 throughout the world. Moreover, our foreign trade,



1 expanded as it is, actually amounts in volume to the  
2 insignificant figure of but three per cent. of the total  
3 volume of world trade, and our country occupies only  
4 the seventh or eighth place among the principal trading  
5 nations of the world, which means that there should  
6 be room for even more efforts than hitherto on the  
7 part of our people. Fortunately, these facts are  
8 being understood more and more by the intelligent pub-  
9 lic of all countries. While cultivating such under-  
10 standing to a greater degree and upholding our position  
11 on an absolutely fair and just basis, we will strive  
12 to obtain the adjustment of mutual interests with every  
13 one of the powers concerned.

14 "Finally, the negotiations with the Netherlands,  
15 which were begun at Batavia in June last year, have  
16 as yet reached no concrete conclusion owing, as was  
17 stated in the last session, to the extreme complexity  
18 and the great variety of questions that have to be  
19 taken into deliberation. However, the labors of the  
20 delegations of both countries during the past six months  
21 or more have succeeded not only in clarifying the  
22 respective positions of Japan and the Netherlands with  
23 reference to trade and removing misunderstandings of  
24 various sorts, but also in laying, I believe, an  
25 important foundation for the negotiations to follow

hereafter.

1            "In conclusion, I wish to stress the need of  
2 extreme caution as well as strong determination on  
3 the part of our people, if, in the midst of the com-  
4 plicated and unsettled conditions which nowadays  
5 universally characterize international relationships,  
6 we are to consolidate our position and to realize the  
7 consummation of our policy and purpose. Japan's with-  
8 drawal from the League of Nations will become effective  
9 on the 27th of March next, and ours will be a greater  
10 burden of responsibility. But the road for Japan to  
11 take has long been chosen. Our foreign policy is such  
12 as I have stated. After all, the foreign relations  
13 of a country are a reflection of the moral and material  
14 strength of its people. If all of us, in conformance  
15 to the august will of His Majesty, work together and  
16 do what lies in our power, it will not be difficult,  
17 I am sure, to surmount any obstacles we may encounter.  
18 In the face of the gravity of the present international  
19 situation I wish to appeal specially for the united  
20 support of the whole nation."  
21

22            THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn until half-  
23 past nine tomorrow morning.  
24

25            (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was  
taken until Tuesday, 30 September 1947, at 0930.)

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